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THE GREAT RINDERPEST EPIDEMIC IN NATAL AND ZULULAND: A CASE
STUDY OF ECOLOGICAL BREAK-DOWN AND ECONOMIC COLLAPSE
by Charles Ballard
The 1890s and early 1900s were difficult years for many agricultural communities
throughout much of the African continent, particularly the eastern and southern re-
gions. The causes of the severe crop and stock losses among farmers, and the attendant
social and political repercussions that followed in the wake of destruction, are squarely
attributable to a cluster of unprecedented natural disasters. The African continent,
from Somaliland in the north to the Cape Province in the south, reeled under the dev-
astating effects of first, a locust plague, then the dreaded cattle epidemics of rinderpest
and East Coast Fever. These afflictions were cruelly punctuated by a series of prolong-
ed and searing droughts that further clipped agriculturalists.1 The natural disasters of
the 1890s and 1900s have been pointed to as important "re-infordng factors" that con-
tributed to the decline of southern African peasant communities.2 In the German col-
ony of Tanganyika rinderpest is claimed to have broken the "economic backbone of
many of the most prosperous and advanced communities" and "initiated the break-
down of a long-established ecological balance and placed nature again at an advantage.3
The repercussions of the rinderpest epidemic on Natal and Zululand were no less severe
as an examination of the more explicit political and socio-economic responses of black
and white communities reveals.
Before 1895 Natal and Zululand had, naturally, been beset by drought and stock
disease. Between 1860 and 1895 a general drought occurred throughout the region on
average every six years.4 1878 and 1881 stand out as particularly bad drought years
and the sugar and maize crops were cut by as much as half.5 American maize was im-
ported to feed Africans on the verge of starvation in several "Native Locations" in
1881.6 Parapatetic white traders introduced bovine pleuro-pneumonia or lungsickness
into Natal and Zululand in the mid-1850s and this killed thousands of cattle in Natal
and especially Zululand. A renewed flare up began in 1872 and it wiped out approx-
imately half of the cattle in the Zulu Kingdom alone.7 Horsesickness was an almost
perennial scourge of the equine population and blue tongue took a heavy toll of sheep
among farmers in the 1860s and 1870s.8 There were no serious insect infestations in
colonial Natal and Zululand before 1895 save for a small swarm of locusts which touch-
ed down briefly near Durban in 1851.9
Apart from the normal cyclical adversities of drought, flooding and occasional stock
disease, nineteenth century Natal and Zululand had generally favourable and predictable
climatic and ecological conditions for agricultural development. Both the black and
The great Rinderpest epidemic in Natal and Zululand
OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF MAIZE AND
Divisions
IXOPO
UPPER
UMKOMANZI
IPOLELA
MAPAMULO
KRANTZKOP
ALFRED
ESTCOURT
UMGENI
INANDA
NEWCASTLE
LOWER
TUGELA
NDWEDWE
UMSINGA
UMVOTI
KLIP RIVER
LOWER
UMZIMKULU
ALEXANDRA
IMPENDHLE
NEW HANOVER
DUNDEE
WEENEN
UMLAZI
UPPER
TUGELA
LIONS RIVER
AFRICANS IN NATAL
*Maize -
1895
65 572
102 875
28 920
57 375
20 085
28 152
36 504
23 283
4 500
30 500
10 150
21668
59 928
27 425
23 093
18 000
4 550
8 000
6 395
26 530
47 250
5 662
3 596
7 991
(Muids)***
1896
1 511
3 720
4 020
10 000
5 000
7 000
11 353
7 742
1 526
10 978
3 745
8 000
25 000
13 000
11 254
10 000
2 800
5 500
5 800
26 250
47 250
5 835
4 450
12 030
SORGHUM PRODUCTION AMONGST
FOR 1895 AND 1896
%
decline
97.7
96.4
86.1
82.6
75.2
75.2
68.9
66.8
66.1
64.1
63.2
63.1
58.3
52.6
51.3
44.5
38.5
31.2
9.4
1.0
-
(+3.0)
(+23.0)
(+50.0)
Sorghum -
1895
26 265
30 000
25 956
30 605
43 934
22 810
25 939
19 884
2 160
17 889
8 439
12 186
14 982
14 410
43 121
7 000
12 400
4 000
4 155
23 030
25 600
3 551
3 200
2 016
(Muids)
1896
510
2 150
5 720
8 000
10 000
4 500
8 288
2 500
1032
5 469
3 120
12 000
40 000
13 000
12 121
5 000
12 360
3 735
3 740
21 228
25 600
3 364
2 435
773
%
decline
98.1
92.9
78.0
73.9
77.3
80.3
68.1
87.5
52.3
69.5
63.1
1.6
(+166.9)
9.8
71.9
28.6
0.4
6.7
10.0
7.9
-
5.3
24.0
61.7
*#
Maize was the more important crop for Africans and it is used to determine the
sequence of ranking in the table.
Those Divisions above the dotted line suffered what were considered substantial
crop losses of 30 per cent or more and those Divisions below the dotted line
suffered little or no crop losses of less than 30 percent.
The muid was a standard dry measure in Natal and is equivalent to 196 English
pounds.
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white farming communities had, it seems, been successful in the management of their
agricultural systems. Until the mid-1890s there had been no major environmental crisis
or series of crises capable of destroying the stock and cropping systems of large sections
of the population.
Between 1860 and 1895 the white farming community had developed a diversified
system based on the production of major export staples such as sugar, wattle, wool,
tea, coffee and ostrich feathers. Maize and other breadstuffs were not profitable crops
for white farmers before the 1900s because of their inability to compete with foreign
grain in both the import and export markets, and because the major consumers of
maize, the African population, grew enough to meet their subsistence needs.1 °
During the mid-and late nineteenth century, Natal's black farmers had quite success-
fully adapted their pre-colonial subsistence crop staples of maize and sorghum to meet
the new demands and wants generated by an emergent capitalist political economy.
Black peasants found that they could continue to grow their narrow range of food crops
to satisfy their basic subsistence requirements, and, at the same time, produce surpluses
of maize and sorghum for sale on the local markets in order to pay their Hut Taxes,
their rents, if they were tenants on white-owned lands, and their purchases of manufac-
tured items.11 In addition to their over-reliance on two grain crops, black peasants had
developed a cattle complex upon which the foundations of their storeable wealth and
social system largely rested.12 Before 1895 no natural disasters of sufficient magnitude
had tested the merits of either the black or white agricultural systems. The appearance
of locusts in 1895-96, the forerunner to rinderpest, showed up the weaknesses of the
narrow base of black agriculture in a pitiless light, compared to the more diversified and
politically stronger white farming sector.
Vast swarms of red locusts (Nomadacris Septumfascinata Serville) swept out of
north-eastern Africa onto the coastal belt of Natal and Zululand as early as August 1895
and stripped bare the fields of sugar cane and mealies.13 For twelve long months
"immense clouds of them swept over the land in all directions, sometimes so vast as to
render dimmer the light of the sun**.14 The locust swarms of 1894 and 1895 severely
cut sugar production. Surgar exports fell from a total of 121 721 cwt in 1895 to
36 123 cwt in 1896.15 The locust plague bore down most heavily on peasant commu-
nities. The weaknesses attributable to a narrow-based cropping system was realised du-
ring the locust infestations. The destruction of large portions of the subsistence crops
of maize and sorghum led predictably to widespread malnutrition, indebtedness, increas-
ed labour migrancy and starvation among women, children and the elderly (see Table I).
The magnitude of the distress among blacks is apparent in the fact that eighteen out of
twenty-six of Natal's Magisterial Divisions suffered heavy crop losses of thirty to ninety-
five percent (see Map). The Black population in these eighteen Divisions was estimated
at 432 973 or nearly seventy-six percent of the total African population in Natal.16
Black peasants had little or no political power and thus received none of the services or
benefits provided to white farmers in combatting the pernicious insects.17 The 1896
Locust Plague was the first in a wave of natural calamities to hit the region and it weak-
ened the peasantry materially and psychologically and made them more vulnerable to
the scourge of Rinderpest. The Commissioner of Agriculture summarised the tribula-
tions of N a til's farmers in his annual report and hinted that a worse catastrophe was
imminent in 1897:
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Divisions that suffered substantial- 30 percent or more staple crop losses due
to locusts.
* Zululand was not incorporated into Natal until 1897; thus the areas of
locust devastation arc only approximate as Government record keeping was
not as precise for Zululand as for Natal proper.
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. . . the past year was, from an agricultural point of view, fraught with
many disasters and losses, arising chiefly from drought and the ravages
of locusts. To these drawbacks has to be added the dread of an out-
break of rinderpest, from which the Cape Colony and the adjoining
Republics have been and still are suffering serious losses.18
Rinderpest was defined as 'an accurate contagious virus disease of ruminants and
swine, characterized by diarrhoea, nasal and lacrimal discharge and by ulceration of the
mucous membrane of the mouth'.19 The Natal government authorities and the general
public were alerted to the devastating effects of rinderpest in the Boer Republics,
Rhodesia and the Cape Colony well in advance of its actual arrival in Natal and Zulu-
land. In early May 1896 rinderpest broke out among trek oxen on the Harrismith
town-lands on the Natal-Free State border.2 ° White farmers, concerned over rinderpest
entering Natal and infecting their cattle, attended the Rinderpest Conference in Pieter-
maritzburg in May 1896 and were informed by Natal's Chief Veterinary Surgeon that
"no remedies have yet proved of any use . . ."2* Many a hardened farmer must have
paled when the Chief Veterinary Surgeon described the symptoms and the horrible
death of cattle stricken by rinderpest:
Experience soon guides the eye and ear, and the broken-winded cough
and the discharge of tears from angry-looking eyes are at once noticed.
As the disease runs on, the animal becomes dull and disinclined to rise
from the ground - some of the beasts may be constipated, passing hard
pellets of yellow-grey clay - but most will be affected by a watery and
foeted diarrhoea, often tinged with blood. The temperature is very
high, and the breathing laboured, . . . ropey saliva hangs round the
mouth and nostrils . . . As the temperature fulls, the animal becomes
semi-cornotose and weaker, muscles quiver incessantly, moaning and
gulping increase, and about six days after an attack commences the
beast dies . . } 2
Pressure mounted on the Natal Government to make preparations for preventing the
disease from entering the colony through rinderpest infected livestock, hides, clothing
and people passing from the Orange Free State, the South African Republic and Zulu-
land. In a special meeting of the Natal Farmers Conference in May 1896 a resolution
was passed "to ask that the borders might be closed".23 The Natal Government re-
sponded with a "General Plan for Meeting the Dangers of Rinderpest". The main pro-
visions of the plan were the following:
A fence is in course of erection from the extreme northern point of
the Colony along the north-eastern boundary towards the mouth of
the Tugela. An inner fence will be constructed as soon as possible so
as to establish a neutral zone between the two fences.
Each border will be closed against all traffic the moment that this
extreme step is warranted by the spread of the disease in the neigh-
bouring territory.
The best protection against the spread of the disease is the immediate
repair of all existing fences, and the fencing of all farms not already
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fenced, and the making of inside paddocks.
The Government will consider favourably all applications for loans to
be used in erecting fences as a protection against Rinderpest.
Four Veterinary Surgeons may be expected in the Colony . . . to assist
the head of the Veterinary Department in his duties.
Steps are being taken to explain to the natives the character of the
disease, and to secure their aid and assistance in the necessary precau-
tions on location lands.2 4
The Natal government ordered the Commissioner of Agriculture to undertake the
fencing off of the boudries between Natal and the Transvaal, the Free State and Zulu-
land as a measure to prevent infected cattle from entering the colony. By June 1897
around 535 miles of fence had been erected on Natal's borders at an average cost of SO
per mile.2 s Natal's Department of Agriculture employed 883 men to serve in the cam-
paign against rinderpest. Natal was divided into 21 districts manned by 21 Inspectors,
127 European guards and 679 African levies. The Europeans were armed with carbines
and all employees both black and white were sworn in as Special Constables with the
authority to quarantine infected herds, to shoot diseased animals if necessary and to
arrest those persons guilty of contravening quarantine restrictions by bringing cattle
across the border into Natal. The government also ordered the mountain passes be-
tween Natal and Basutoland to be dynamited so as to make them impassable to cattle
and oxwagons.26 The Natal government spent 176 715 on fences, disinfecting sta-
tions, and employees' salaries in its bid to prevent rinderpest from entering the
Colony.2 7
A heavy burden of responsibility fell on the Department of the Secretary for Native
Affairs, (SNA), when the task of controlling rinderpest in the numerous African Re-
serves or "Locations" was handed over to the SNA by an already over-loaded Depart-
ment of Agriculture.28 The Secretary for Native Affairs, Frederick Moor, did not see
the immediate urgency of alarming the Colony's black population over rinderpest be-
cause the epidemic had not penetrated beyond the Transvaal and Northern Orange Free
State in early 1896. The Times of Natal (Durban) reflected the fears of many white
settlers that the co-operation and assistance of Africans was essential if the rinderpest
was to be kept out of the locations: the editorial appealed that "no time should,
therefore, be lost in fully acquainting the natives of the nature of the disease, and of the
measures it may be necessary to take for its suppression".29 Two days later the SNA
sent the Colonial Secretary a directive for dissemination to the Resident Magistrates and
to the Locations:
I think it will be well if you will cause the Natives, generally, to be
told through the Magistrates, that there is a bad cattle disease in the
Transvaal, and the Government has stopped all cattle from coming
into Transvaal. Natives near the Transvaal border should also be told
that they are expected to give immediate notice to the Magistrate or
Police if they hear of any cattle attempting to cross the Transvaal
boundary.30
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Many whites in Natal harboured the conviction that if rinderpest broke out amongst
the half-million or more African-owned cattle then it would spread disastrously fast if
not checked by the wholesale putting-down or "stamping out" of diseased beasts and
even those that were healthy but had come into contact with rinderpest. The Colonial
Veterinary Surgeon (CVS) advised the SNA to wam Africans that stamping out may be
resorted to, but that "much of their opposition would be overcome, especially if com-
pensation were given*'.31 The SNA did not agree fully with the CVS and was hesitant
to unduly alarm African stock-keepers of so extreme a measure as "stamping out" as it
might foment disturbances - something that was always dreaded by a security and econ-
omy minded SNA. The Natal Witness was critical of the SNA's 'soft-line' on the stamp-
ing out issue and warned its readers that "what there is reason to fear is a degree of
tenderness for the Native that will bring ruin to the white man".3 2
The SNA moved slowly and cautiously in broaching the subject of rinderpest among
Africans. It was not until 18 September 1896 that Moor directed R.O. Samuelson, the
Under-Secretary for Native Affairs (USNA) to proceed to the Umsinga, Krantzkop and
Mapumulo Divisions where he would meet the Chiefs and Headmen and . . . "Tell them
that the cattle plague, known as rinderpest, is steadily advancing southwards and that it
has reached the northern ports of the Transvaal and Barkly West,. . . Explain to them
the nature of the disease, and tell them of the havoc it has done where it lias broken
out." The SNA was also called upon by the Department of Agriculture to instruct
Africans living near the Colony's borders to give their labour to the Government's
scheme for "the conveyance of fencing materials and other requisites to the Border and
in the erection of the fence". Although blacks were drafted into state service, they
were to be "remunerated by the Government for their services".33 The "Border tribes"
most affected by the SNA's anti-rinderpest campaign were the Amaqamvu under Chief
Kula, the Amabomvu under Chiefs Mawele and Homoi, the Amakabela under Chief
Gayede, the Amangcolosi under Chief Hlangabeza, the Amacele under Chief Geveza, the
Hohoza under Chief Mkonto and the Amazulu under Chief Timuni.34
Before the SNA made its plans for preventing entry of rinderpest into the locations
public, the colony's newspapers criticised the SNA for its failure to inform the white
public of its policy towards the Locations. Moor was ridiculed for his uninformative
administration:
The greatest anxiety has prevailed to know the intentions of the
Government in regard of Locations, of the treatment of native cattle,
and the liberty of natives to roam the country at their own pleasure,
or the next thing to i t . . . The Secretary for Native Affairs maintain-
ed an inflexible silence, but that Minister works on the principle of
not letting his left hand know what his right is about.3 5
In 1896 the decimation of cattle by rinderpest in the Transvaal and the Free State
was already having disastrous consequences for transport riders from Natal. Thousands
of whites and even more blacks were engaged in the haulage of goods by ox-wagon be-
tween Natal and Witwatersrand gold fields. Many transport riders had a sizeable invest-
ment bound up in wagons, harnesses and trained oxen.36 The rinderpest epidemic
brought almost complete chaos and paupery to Natal transport riders unlucky enough to
be stranded on the cold winter veldt of the interior with a lifetime's investment in oxen
destroyed in as little as thirty hours. The Government of the South African Republic
resorted to stamping out measures and black transport riders from Natal complained
bitterly that the Transvaalers shot their cattle whether they were infected with rinder-
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pest or not. A Natal African, Joseph Gumede, bitterly denounced the Government for
not providing assistance to their transport riders disabled and hungry in the Transvaal:
. . . what great trouble some of my brethren are now in, with no
chance of help from those our noble Queen depends on to help and do
justice to us poor natives in Natal? . . . when we find all we have work-
ed very hard for, in the shape of a span of oxen and wagon, got
through many years of patient toil, and now are cast adrift in a foreign
state where it is so cold that our cattle will die, then we feel it is time
to appeal for justice at the hands of our good Government, to help us
with the Transvaal Government first, and afterwards to give us a place
to quarantine our cattle, until . . . our cattle are free from all
disease.3 7
The Natal Government, in its bid to quarantine the colony from infected cattle and
goods in the interior Republics placed a further obstacle in the path of destitute white
and black transport riders by sealing off the main roads from the Transvaal and Free
State in late May 1896.38 Transport riders with healthy teams of oxen were largely
prevented from returning because it was feared, quite correctly, that they may be carr-
iers of rinderpest. Thus, until the discovery of a fairly effective method of immunizing
livestock in mid 1897, tens of thousands of transport oxen were sacrificed in vain efforts
to stamp-out rinderpest. The destruction of much of Natal's ox-drawn transport system
represented extremely heavy capital losses for most transport riders. It meant an even
more serious loss of income for black peasants who had been either fully engaged in
transport riding or combined it with farming and itinerant trading. Joseph Gumede
pointed to the hardships facing the stranded and hungry blacks in the Transvaal, and the
economic strains that relief efforts placed on an increasingly impoverished peasantry:
. . . Up to the present we have spent most of our earnings in buying
food at exhorbitant prices, and we will not be able to hold on much
longer, for we have now to send our crops by train to keep our boys
alive at the wagons. This will be the last straw, for it will mean starva-
tion in the near future.3 9
During the latter months of 1896 the SNA made further contingencies for the
isolation of African Locations should rinderpest break out. The Resident Magistrates
were directed to "appoint certain Chiefs and Headmen in the Locations as Supervisors in
connection with the prevention of the introduction and spread of Rinderpest". The
SNA placed the African supervisors under the Magistrate's control and the Government
remunerated them at the "rate of E 3 per month". The SNA spelled out the duties of
the supervisors to the Magistrates. They were to "supervise the cattle of the members"
of their tribes and to isolate and tie up any beast that showed signs of sickness. The
Chiefs were also ordered to "see that no cattle cross the proclaimed cordons, and to
report . . . any cattle which may have been brought into the Location in breach of the
cordon regulations".40 The SNA proclaimed further its intentions of quarantining all
Locations in the colony should rinderpest threaten:
If the rinderpest does break out in the Location no cattle will be per-
mitted to be moved from infected area, but the area will be isolated.
The driving of cattle from any part of a Location in which an out-
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break has taken place to any other locality will be prohibited, wheth-
er such cattle are infected or not. All movements of oxen or cattle
of any kind will be forbidden.41
The news that the Natal public awaited with dread occurred on 16 January 1897
when it was reported in the colony's press that an assistant veterinary surgeon "discover-
ed a suspicious case of cattle disease on a farm a few miles from Dundee". On the 17th
Natal's Principal Veterinary Surgeon, the Commissioner of Agriculture and the Minister
of Agriculture visited the farm and diagnosed the case as "undoubtedly rinderpest."42
Although the Dundee outbreak was the first reported case of rinderpest in Natal, it was
later confirmed that the disease had broken out earlier among trek-oxen at Ladysmith,
but that its presence was "not reported for a considerable time".4 3
In spite of the effort and money expended by the Natal authorities on controlling
the spread of rinderpest, this proved to be completely ineffectual. There were a host of
factors which ensured the spread of the dread disease. Most significant is the fact that a
large number of whites and blacks were active in transport riding and their trek oxen
carried rinderpest across the Natal border from the already infected Transvaal, Free
State and Cape Colony. The livelihood of transport riders depended on moving goods
and they often found ways to slip past the border guards and the disinfecting stations
without being detected.44 White and black public opinion in Natal blamed the Natal
Government for the outbreak of rinderpest because of the failure of the Natal authori-
ties to close the borders of the Free State and Transvaal before infected trek-oxen had
crossed over into the colony. A lack of control over transport riders by the Govern-
ment was pointed out as the reason for Ladysmith outbreak:
Until the information that rinderpest had broken out in the Colony
was received here on the 18th (July) hundreds of tons of forage and
farm produce were brought to Ladysmith from Harrismith, from an
area in which the disease was spreading in every direction, and sent
right and left over the Colony.4 s
The Natal Government's policy of setting-up "disinfecting stations" to fumigate
people and goods entering Natal at the main border posts proved to be both controver-
sial and inadequate. At Charlestown, on the borders of the Transvaal, white railway
passengers were "bundled off the train to a government disinfecting station where they
were "fumigated" with a light solvent spray of bacterial disinfectant. The main flaw of
this system was that while people, and the clothing they happened to be wearing, were
fumigated, "the clothes and belongings in the compartments"46 were not, thus goods
and other baggage most probably carried the highly contagious rinderpest virus into
Natal.
Africans returning from the Transvaal received contemptible treatment as they were
unceremoniously stripped and queued for fumigation. Africans complained bitterly at
being stripped and having their clothes soaked with the disinfectant and then having to
don them while still in a wet and cold state. The SNA pointed out the health hazards
of such insensitive procedures to the Commissioner of Agriculture, whose Department
was in charge of the disinfecting stations at Charlestown:
It has come to my notice that natives at Charlestown have their
clothes drenched in some disinfectant fluid and that they have to put
them on again before they are dry and have to wear them till they
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dry on their bodies.
The cold weather is setting in now and this procedure is fraught with
danger to the natives concerned. Washing and drenching clothes
should be avoided and some other means of disinfectant should be
adopted if possible.4 7
The Commissioner of Agriculture, C.B. Uoyd, complied with the SNA's suggestions
and ordered the Charles town station "to stop all clothing being returned to natives in a
damp condition and . . . to make arrangements by which the clothing could be quickly
and effectively dried".48 When questioned by the local press on the supposed controv-
ersy and effectiveness of the fumigation of Africans at Charles town, the Secretary for
Native Affairs played down the complaints and attempted to assuage his settler critics
with the assurance that "every batch of natives disinfected has been told the reason for
the operation, has been warned about the disease, and told of its dangerous
character".49
Another criticism hurled at the Natal Government over its handling of the rinderpest
epidemic was a lack of preparedness and foresight in the fencing of the borders of the
colony. White farmers, many of them members of the influential Natal Farmers Con-
ference, charged the Department of Agriculture of not having taken steps soon enough
to ensure that there were stores of imported fencing materials adequate to meet the
needs of the Government's ambitious programme and, at the same time, cater to the de-
mands of white fanners anxious to fence their own farms and paddocks. Approximate-
ly 7 889 tons of barbed wire and other fencing materials valued at 72 271 were im-
ported into the colony from Britain and the United States during 1896,50 but it was
not enough to meet the rocketing demands. Material shortages, frustrating delays and
exorbitant prices underlined the complaints of many disgruntled farmers:
In May (1896) a special meeting of the Conference passed resolutions
requesting that the borders of the Colony might be fenced. The
fencing was not started until August, and, no preparation having
been made to obtain material, the market here was rushed and all
supplies bought up by the Government, thus sending up the cost of
materials and preventing many fanners from fencing their lands for
many months.s *
What stunned the Natal authorities most of all was the breath-taking rapidity with
which rinderpest spread all over the colony seemingly at once. The Commissioner of
Agriculture wrote in amazement that "when, however, the disease appeared, it did so al-
most simultaneously over two-thirds of the Colony".52 Of the twenty-six magisterial
divisions in the colony, twenty-four were infected with rinderpest between 16 July and
30 October 1897 as the following figures reveal:
OUTBREAK OF RINDERPEST IN NATAL
July 16 - July 31 9 Magisterial Divisions Affected
" 3 1 - August 12 6
August 12 - August 31 3
" 3 1 - September 20 6
September 20 - October 30 1
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All observers of the 1897 Rinderpest epidemic are unanimous in their opinions that
cattle losses to the dread disease were more than twice as severe among blacks as among
whites. The Commissioner of Agriculture stated in his annual report for 1897 that. . .
that there are many cases where European farmers have lost prac-
tically all their cattle is unfortunately too true, and the owners de-
serve every consideration, but from what information is accessible at
present, the losses throughout the Colony in herds belonging to
Europeans will be about 40 per cent, and in those belonging to na-
tives 90 per cent.5 4
Reports of appalling losses in cattle from rinderpest poured in from all over Natal
and Zululand. The Magistrate of the Klip River Division calculated that 20 108 head of
stock had died from the epidemic and that "the mortality may be fairly set down at 90
per cent amongst stock belonging to natives, and about 65 per cent amongst stock be-
longing to Europeans". Once wealthy Chief Bande, the Magistrate said, was the greatest
loser, the mortality amongst his head amounting to 760 head. "This man has now 29
head of cattle only, and from being one of the most opulent natives in the neighbour-
hood, is now comparatively poor".5 5
In the latter months of 1897 the bile and serum methods for inoculating cattle were
produced in South Africa and distributed to farmers.56 Many black peasants believed
that the white man had introduced the rinderpest epidemic and they had little or no
faith in inoculation. The Natal Witness reported the disturbed and resentful mood of
Africans towards whites in the sugarbelt Divisions of Lower Tugela and Inanda:
We are told . . . that the natives regard the advent of rinderpest as en-
tirely the fault of the white man. "He brought the disease from a
distance for the purpose of inoculation, and so kills, not only his
own cattle, but also that of the natives". The latter are sulky, dis-
gusted, bewildered. The informant thinks, however, that there is no
chance of a rising, seeing the natives are without firearms.5 7
The Africans had much justification in being bewildered and angry at whites and the
officials of the Department of Agriculture and the SNA in particular who carried the
anti-rinderpest campaign. Before the serum inoculation method proved successful, the
Rinderpest Commissioners, Magistrates and Special Constables simply resorted to the
wholesale shooting of African cattle in the Locations which had been in contact with
rinderpest but were still healthy. This was cause for many angry complaints. When the
new serum method was implemented in late July of 1897 the SNA quickly authorised
the discontinuation of "stamping out". Moor attempted to ease tensions between the
rinderpest officers and the Africans in the epidemic ravaged Upper Tugela Divisions by
calling a halt to the cattle killings:
Please inform Ncwadi and Mnyamana without delay, that, owing to
the numerous cases of Rinderpest which have already occurred in the
Klip River and Dundee Divisions, the Government has resolved that
there shall be no more killing of cattle, but that inoculation shall be
resorted to in preference.5 8
The SNA was drafted into providing the bulk of inoculation services for "Location"
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Africans by an overworked Department of Agriculture. The SNA instructed all the
Resident Magistrates to "Please suggest the names of two suitable persons in Your Divi-
sion whom you can recommend to be instructed in inoculation, in connection with
Rinderpest, with a view to their being able to assist such natives as may desire to adopt
this course".59 The Secretary for Native Affairs told the press that "I am getting the
best men I can to assist the Natives with inoculation where they desire it". Moor stated
further that his Department had "advertised asking the missionaries to assist the natives
on their stations, and we are willing to supply them with all the necessary instru-
ments".60
Black peasants were suspicious of inoculation, at first, because of the indifferent and
even dire results of the imperfect bile inoculation method. Bile inoculation involved
the inoculation of healthy and supposedly rinderpest-free stock with bile from an infect-
ed animal. The result being that the injected beast would through the bile catalyst and
after a brief illness symptomatic of rinderpest, either recover and be immunized or it
would succumb and die. The SNA inoculators had many disappointing results from the
bile method and many Africans became resistant to its use when they saw some of their
cattle dying from the procedure.61
In September 1897 the serum inoculation method was introduced into Natal from
the Transvaal where it had proved far superior to the bile method in the immunization
of healthy cattle and in the curing of diseased animals. The process involved simply,
the inoculation of healthy stock with 100 c.c. of blood from the fortunate few animals
which had survived the rinderpest and were thus immunized or "salted".62 Cattle that
were already suffering from symptoms of the plague were given a more potent dosage of
between two and three hundred c.c. of "salted" blood. An eighty to ninety percent
success rate had been achieved among herds in the northern Cape and the Transvaal.6 3
By mid-October 1897 the rinderpest officials were busy with serum inoculation through-
out much of the Colony. The SNA discontinued the bile method of inoculation "owing
to the results proving generally unsatisfactory**.64 The SNA allocated the modest sum
of 2 000 for expenditure entailed in the supply of serum, instruments and the employ-
ment of nine inoculation officers throughout most of the colony's Locations.6* Al-
though the SNA "let it be known among natives that the Government is ready and will-
ing to render them all assistance as regards the inoculating of their stock",6 6 the rinder-
pest plague had already done most of its deadly work among the cattle population of
Natal. A further complication delayed the inoculation of cattle because of the great
scarcity of "salted" cattle from which the precious serum was processed. By late
October 1897 the SNA just requested African stock-keepers to "be careful to preserve
cattle which have recovered from the disease, because it is from such that the serum,
which will save sick cattle and immunize those not diseased, can be obtained . . . " Of
course, the plague had, by October 1897, already killed the majority of African cattle.
The mixed responses of impoverished and restless Africans to inoculation was a
source of controversy within the Colony. White settlers and officials blamed African
resistance to inoculation on superstitious taboos inherent to their traditional culture.
Africans had only themselves to blame for the high mortality rate amongst their herds -
a theme echoed by many official observers. "This terrible scourge",67 wrote the Mag-
istrate of the New Hanover Division, "has completely devastated the herds of cattle be-
longing to natives; the result, undoubtedly of the unwillingness on the natives* part to
resort to inoculation before the disease had attacked their cattle".68 However, the
Magistrate of the Upper Tugela Division revealed in his report how the precious serum
was distributed to inoculate "European cattle, while the intermediate native cattle were
left to their fate". This discriminatory policy "gave the natives a good cause for com-
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plaint, and of which they will always make the most".69 It is more than likely that
many Africans, especially those living in remote areas of the colony, never gained access
to the rinderpest serum while white fanners had a distinctive advantage in communica-
tions with the Government veterinary services.70 In addition to the inadequate and un-
equal anti-rinderpest measures taken by the Government, the Africans' system of land
tenure and usage in Colonial Natal put them at a further disadvantage as they grazed
their cattle together on large communal pastures and this fanned rinderpest through
their herds much faster than through white-owned cattle which were separated into
smaller herds on individual farms, further distances apart.
The rinderpest epidemic precipitated a major economic crisis for black peasant agri-
culture in Natal. With 80 to 90 percent of their cattle dead many Africans who depend-
ed on transport riding for their livelihood became destitute almost overnight and had to
seek jobs in the towns and mines. More seriously, a growing neglect of cultivation
occurred in many areas due to "Rinderpest having swept off all native oxen". The Mag-
istrate of the Mapumulo Division noted somberly that "there will be no oxen to plough
with at the next planting season".7 4 Rinderpest impoverished many hundreds of black
peasant tenants living on white farms throughout Natal and either drove them off the
land or made them more indebted to their white landlords. The Magistrate of the
Ixopo Division recorded the plight of rent-paying peasants. "The losses of cattle from
rinderpest have been truly distressing . . . and I fancy the Europeans will find it nec-
essary to reduce the high rents paid by many native tenants.72 Other white observers
believed rinderpest to be a mixed blessing for the loss of cattle would in future force
more and more black peasants off the land into wage labour. Such hopes were express-
ed by the ambivalent Magistrate of the New Hanover Division:
It is to be hoped that the losses sustained by the natives will ulti-
mately awaken the men to the necessity there exists for developing
habits of industry . . . Up to the present, however, no thought
appears to be by them on the future and their time seems to be spent
chiefly in drinking beer and in breaking heads at faction fights, the
latter being always the result of the former.7 3
One of the firmest indicators that black peasants had suffered much larger quantita-
tive losses in cattle from rinderpest was born out in the statistics showing the total
amount of stock owned by blacks and whites. In 1896 blacks owned an estimated
494 402 cattle and whites 242 165. The 1898 totals reveal a startling plunge in the
number of cattle held by blacks - 75 842 head - as opposed to whites who owned
155 456 head.74 In fact, for the first time in the colony's history whites owned more
cattle than blacks (see graph). It took blacks nearly eight years (1905) to recoup their
losses to the point where their herds equalled the 1896 figure. White farmers suffered
less from the 1897 rinderpest epidemic than blacks and they reaped high profits by sell-
ing stock to Africans anxious to buy "salted"or rinderpest free oxen for ploughing,
transport-riding and ilobola. In 1898 the Magistrate of the Umvoti Division remarked
that "the value of cattle has risen at 100 ".7 s The demands for cattle rose enormously
due to the losses incurred through rinderpest and the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1901. The
farmers who had stock for sale must have been gleeful as they saw the average price of
salted cattle in Natal and Zululand treble and even quadruple between 1895 and 1905:
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AVERAGE PRICE OF CATTLE IN NATAL AND ZULULAND
YEAR WHITE-OWNED CATTLE BLACK-OWNED CATTLE
1895 5 5
1896 6 6
1897 7 7
1898 13 13
1900 20 20
1901 16 16
1903 17 13
1905 15 9
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While a few white farmers reaped huge profits from the sale of cattle, the rinderpest
epidemic had an overall detrimental effect on the regional economy. Consumers of red
meat and dairy products had to pay between 33 and 50 per cent more for these foods.
Natal faced a real shortage of red meat during 1897 and 1898 as a result of rinderpest.
This necessitated a much larger importation of chilled/preserved meats and dairy prod-
uce from Australia, North America and Argentina from 1897 until at least 1903-04.77
Rinderpest, in effect, opened up the colony's doors to cheaper imports of basic food-
stuffs and Natal's trade deficit with its trading partners rose significantly during these
years.78 So alarming was the flood of imported meat and dairy products into the
colony that representatives of the white farming sector in the Legislative Assembly made
strident appeals for protective tariffs to be levied against imported meat. One Leg-
islator assailed the "unholy compact" entered into by the colony's butchers and meat
importers whereby half of their meat supplies would be bought from overseas producers
on long term (five year) contracts.7 9
The rinderpest epidemic seriously disrupted the socio-economic norms that had
evolved around the cattle-complex of northern Nguni societies. The wiping-out of near-
ly ninety percent of all African-owned cattle from rinderpest not only destroyed black
transport riding and the chief sources of storeable wealth, it threw the entire social sys-
tem out of kilter. A most fundamental social institution, marriage, was thrown into
disarray because of insufficient cattle to meet the normal commitments of Hobo la or
bridewealth that most men were required to give to their prospective fathers-in-law.
Marriages were postponed for lack of "lobola cattle". Black social discontent, partic-
ularly among the marriageable young people manifested itself in the decade following
the rinderpest plague.8 ° Even more serious, were the effects that rinderpest had on the
nutritional levels of many blacks who depended, in large part, on the system of ukusisa,
the custom whereby men wealthy in cattle would loan beasts to poorer relatives or
clients who then were permitted to consume all the milk and to eat beasts that had died
in exchange for tending their patron's herds. Ukusisa was impeded largely by the Natal
Government's directive to Resident Magistrates and Rinderpest Officers to "Warn the
natives to be on their guard against the movement of cattle from place to place within
the Colony and to be very careful not to receive cattle for "sisa" purposes.81 The social
and economic institutions of the African cattle-complex in Natal demanded a large de-
gree of geographic mobility in order to function. The mandatory but erratic quarantine
of all cattle in Natal to their respective farms and locations did little or nothing in pre-
venting the spread of the epidmic. But, the restrictions on mobility had much more
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harmful repercussions for the socially extended and economically interdependent in-
stitutions that formed the core of the cattle-complex in Natal's communities.
The Natal colonial government had, like the government of the Free State, Trans-
vaal and the Cape Colony, failed spectacularly in its efforts to prevent or contain rinder-
pest. As the epidemic gathered in intensity throughout 1897, the general public, both
black as well as white, condemned the Department of Agriculture and the SNA for the
inadequacy of the measures taken to combat the plague, and for the delays that in-
variably occurred in their implementation.82 At the half-yearly meeting of the influen-
tial Natal Farmers' Conference in October 1897, settlers discontent with the Govern-
ment's handling of the cattle disease was voiced in a resolution "that this Conference re-
quests the Government to appoint a Commission to enquire how rinderpest got into the
Colony and how it spread, and, why the 'excellent stringent measures* adopted collaps-
ed". The Natal Government presented an inconclusive report which placed the blame
on the enormity of the epidemic and the inability of any human agency to contain its
spread and destructive capacity before serum inoculation was introduced. The Natal
Witness probably summed up the feelings of many white farmers and even more black
peasants when it concluded that "nearly every step the Government has taken has been
forced upon them. Attempt after attempt has been made to keep them up to the mark,
but they have all failed".83 In its official utterances, the Natal Government went to
great lengths to minimise any charges of unp rep a redness and inefficiency. African dis-
content, and suffering as a result of rinderpest, was expediently ignored to the point
where the British Governor of Natal made the absurd pronouncement that it gave him
"much pleasure to bear testimony to the patient and cheerful way in which the Native
population have borne their severe losses through rinderpest and locusts".84
There was most certainly a psychological dimension to the rinderpest plague. A
number of Divisional Magistrates commented on the streak of fatalism which seemed to
manifest itself in the African population.85 Two disastrous years of locusts, severe
drought and rinderpest, respectively, had destroyed much of the staple subsistence crops
and nearly all the livestock wealth possessed by Africans. These unprecedented calami-
ties probably appeared insurmountable and the "sulky" and "restless" nature attributed
to blacks by white observers was probably an expression of resignation and acquiescence
to forces that were totally beyond the powers of black peasants to resist. The death of
thousands of cattle in 1897 meant that thousands of tons of meat had to be disposed of
fairly quickly. The reported outbreak of food-poisoning among blacks in the Trans-
vaal who had eaten cattle that had died from rinderpest prompted the SNA to issue a
warning to Africans that "cattle dying from rinderpest should at once be burned, and
no portion thereof should be used for food".8 6 Africans ignored the warnings, which,
in any case, turned out to be incorrect, and ate diseased animals in feasting and beer-
drinking that went on for days. The horrible realities of rinderpest must have hung as a
depressing cloud over the Natal countryside. Many white farmers and black peasants
stood by helpless as they watched their cattle die an agonised death. Equally depress-
ing, the landscape was littered with the putrefying carcasses of dead animals. One ob-
server of the plague recalled a hideous and never-to-be-forgotten sight near Grey town:
Cattle died in thousands, and as all sick animals made for water,
streams were soon choked with rotting carcasses. The stench was
terrific, and the bushes fringing the small streams flowing down the
Greytown Hill were covered with a canopy of blue bottle flies in
millions.
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Natal was heavily stocked with cattle at the time, and the losses were
terrific.8 7
CONCLUSION
The 'Great Rinderpest' epidemic of the 1890s was far and away the most traumatic
and devastating of the ecological disasters visited on southern and eastern Africa in re-
cent times. In Natal and Zululand rinderpest largely destroyed the transport riding
business, sent prices of draught oxen and red meat soaring and opened the door to a
flood of imported meat products. The rinderpest epidemic was the lynch-pin in the
wave of natural calamities that collectively produced an ecological breakdown sufficient
to end abruptly the relatively long period of environmental stability that had existed
throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.
The structural and institutional distinctions that existed between the black and
white farming sectors were sharpened further as a result of rinderpest. The fact that
black peasants in Natal were hit hardest by the vicissitudes of nature around the turn of
the century was due to the narrow base of their farming operations and the resultant
over-reliance on the two staple crops of maize and sorghum. These crops were partic-
ularly vulnerable to the combined hazards of protracted drought and locusts. The
rinderpest epidemic of 1897 and later East Coast Fever after the turn of the century de-
pleted African cattle herds by as much as ninety percent. The devastation wrought by
stock disease seriously undermined the very economic and social foundations of rural
black society which relied heavily on cattle for transport riding, ploughing, capital
accumulation and ilobola or bride wealth. Natal's black farmers were also at a marked
disadvantage when compared to their white counterparts for they did not enjoy equal
access to the colony's veterinary and agricultural support services.
The environmental calamities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
has important implications for any analysis of the rise and fall in the fortunes of Natal's
peasantry. The dramatic decline in peasant crop productions and in the numbers of
their cattle occurred at exactly the time when clima to logical and epidemiological forces
combined to upset the rhythm of peasant society.
oooOooo
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